Potential ClickFix Command via Windows Run Dialog

Last updated a month ago on 2026-10-05
Created 2 months ago on 2026-09-24

About

Identifies suspicious commands written to the Windows Run dialog history (RunMRU) by explorer.exe. Adversaries socially engineer users to copy and paste malicious commands for execution, a pattern commonly seen in Fake CAPTCHA (ClickFix) campaigns. Investigate the process tree for a child of explorer.exe that matches the stored command.
Tags
Domain: EndpointOS: WindowsUse Case: Threat DetectionTactic: ExecutionTactic: Defense EvasionTactic: Command and ControlData Source: Elastic DefendData Source: SysmonData Source: Microsoft Defender XDRData Source: SentinelOneData Source: CrowdstrikeThreat: ClickFixThreat: Living off the LandRule Type: ES|QLPlatform: WindowsLanguage: esql
Severity
high
Risk Score
73
MITRE ATT&CK™

Execution (TA0002)(external, opens in a new tab or window)

Defense Evasion (TA0005)(external, opens in a new tab or window)

Command and Control (TA0011)(external, opens in a new tab or window)

License
Elastic License v2(external, opens in a new tab or window)

Definition

Integration Pack
Prebuilt Security Detection Rules
Related Integrations

endpoint(external, opens in a new tab or window)

windows(external, opens in a new tab or window)

m365_defender(external, opens in a new tab or window)

sentinel_one_cloud_funnel(external, opens in a new tab or window)

crowdstrike(external, opens in a new tab or window)

Query
text code block:
from logs-endpoint.events.registry-*, logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*, winlogbeat-*, logs-windows.forwarded-*, logs-m365_defender.event-*, logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*, logs-crowdstrike.fdr* metadata _id, _version, _index | where KQL(""" host.os.type : "windows" AND event.category:"registry" AND process.name:explorer.exe AND event.type : ("creation" or "change") """) and registry.data.strings is not null and ( to_lower(registry.path) like """hkey_users\\*\\software\\microsoft\\windows\\currentversion\\explorer\\runmru\\*""" or to_lower(registry.path) like """\\registry\\user\\*\\software\\microsoft\\windows\\currentversion\\explorer\\runmru\\*""" or to_lower(registry.path) like """hku\\*\\software\\microsoft\\windows\\currentversion\\explorer\\runmru\\*""" or to_lower(registry.path) like """hkcu\\software\\microsoft\\windows\\currentversion\\explorer\\runmru\\*""" or to_lower(registry.path) like """hkey_current_user\\software\\microsoft\\windows\\currentversion\\explorer\\runmru\\*""" ) and not to_lower(registry.path) like """*\\runmru\\mrulist""" | eval registry_data = to_lower(mv_concat(registry.data.strings, " ")) | where // PowerShell / PowerShell 7 with suspicious arguments or content ( (registry_data like "*powershell*" or registry_data like "*pwsh*") and ( registry_data like "*-nop *" or registry_data like "* -e *" or registry_data like "* -ec *" or registry_data like "* -en*" or registry_data like "*irm *" or registry_data like "*iwr *" or registry_data like "*iex *" or registry_data like "*iex(*" or registry_data like "*invoke-restmethod*" or registry_data like "*invoke-webrequest*" or registry_data like "*invoke-expression*" or registry_data like "*invoke-command*" or registry_data like "*$executioncontext.invokecommand*" or registry_data like "*webclient*" or registry_data like "*downloadstring*" or registry_data like "*downloadfile*" or registry_data like "*http*" or registry_data like "*bypass*" or registry_data like "* -w* h*" or registry_data like "* -w* mi*" or registry_data like "* -w *" or registry_data like "*start-process*" or registry_data like "*frombase64string*" or registry_data like "*substring*" or registry_data like "*psitem.definition*" or registry_data like "*+*+*+*" ) ) or // Remote content and script execution through other utilities ( registry_data like "*msiexec*" or registry_data like "*mshta*" or registry_data like "*msbuild*" or registry_data like "*pcalua*" or registry_data like "*regsvr32*" or registry_data like "*rundll32*" or registry_data like "*cmstp.exe*" or registry_data like "*cmd*http*" or registry_data like "*cmd*set*&set*" or registry_data like "*conhost*" or registry_data like "*forfiles*" or registry_data like "*certutil*" or registry_data like "*curl*http*" or registry_data like "*wget*http*" or registry_data like "*bitsadmin*" or registry_data like "*wmic*/f*" or registry_data like "*odbcconf*" or registry_data like "*cmd*nslookup*" or registry_data like "*script*davwwwroot*" or registry_data like "*script*@ssl*" or registry_data like "*cmd*wscript*" or registry_data like """control.exe*\\*\\*""" or registry_data like "*cmd* in (f_*" or registry_data like "*cmd*davwwwroot*" or registry_data like "*cmd*@ssl*" or registry_data like "*cmd*pushd*" or registry_data like "*cmd*/d /c for /r *" or registry_data like "*-appvscript*" or registry_data like "*|*powershell*" or registry_data like "*|*pwsh*" or registry_data like "*iex*irm *" or registry_data like "*iex*iwr *" ) | keep _id, _version, _index, data_stream.namespace, @timestamp, event.dataset, user.id, user.name, user.domain, host.id, host.name, agent.id, process.name, process.entity_id, process.executable, process.pid, registry.data.strings, registry.path

Install detection rules in Elastic Security

Detect Potential ClickFix Command via Windows Run Dialog in the Elastic Security detection engine by installing this rule into your Elastic Stack.

To setup this rule, check out the installation guide for Prebuilt Security Detection Rules(external, opens in a new tab or window).