Identifies a Microsoft Entra ID sign-in that is satisfied by a phishing-resistant, device-bound credential (Windows Hello for Business, FIDO2 security key, or passkey) while carrying no device identifier. Windows Hello for Business (WHfB) and passkey credentials are bound to a device's TPM, so a genuine sign-in with one of these methods is normally accompanied by the registered device it lives on. A WHfB or passkey assertion that authenticates with an empty `device_detail.device_id` indicates the underlying key material is being used away from its bound device, for example by an adversary who extracted the key (or signed an assertion with it) and replayed it from attacker infrastructure to mint device-agnostic tokens. This is the core primitive of the "borrowing Windows Hello keys" technique and is a strong precursor to attacker device registration and Primary Refresh Token (PRT) issuance. Cross-tenant (B2B) sign-ins are excluded because they are a common benign source of empty device identifiers.