AdminSDHolder Backdoor

Last updated 9 days ago on 2025-01-22
Created 3 years ago on 2022-01-31

About

Detects modifications in the AdminSDHolder object. Attackers can abuse the SDProp process to implement a persistent backdoor in Active Directory. SDProp compares the permissions on protected objects with those defined on the AdminSDHolder object. If the permissions on any of the protected accounts and groups do not match, the permissions on the protected accounts and groups are reset to match those of the domain's AdminSDHolder object, regaining their Administrative Privileges.
Tags
Domain: EndpointOS: WindowsUse Case: Threat DetectionTactic: PersistenceUse Case: Active Directory MonitoringData Source: Active DirectoryData Source: SystemLanguage: kuery
Severity
high
Risk Score
73
MITRE ATT&CK™

Persistence (TA0003)(opens in a new tab or window)

License
Elastic License v2(opens in a new tab or window)

Definition

Rule Type
Query (Kibana Query Language)
Integration Pack
Prebuilt Security Detection Rules
Index Patterns
winlogbeat-*logs-system.*logs-windows.*
Related Integrations

system(opens in a new tab or window)

windows(opens in a new tab or window)

Query
event.code:5136 and winlog.event_data.ObjectDN:CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System*

Install detection rules in Elastic Security

Detect AdminSDHolder Backdoor in the Elastic Security detection engine by installing this rule into your Elastic Stack.

To setup this rule, check out the installation guide for Prebuilt Security Detection Rules(opens in a new tab or window).