Potential FileFix Command via Windows Explorer Address Bar

Last updated a month ago on 2026-10-05
Created 2 months ago on 2026-09-28

About

Identifies suspicious commands written to the Windows Explorer address bar history (TypedPaths). Adversaries socially engineer users to paste a command into the address bar of File Explorer or of a browser's file upload dialog, a pattern known as FileFix; the writing process is therefore explorer.exe or the browser hosting the dialog. Stored commands that invoke PowerShell, cmd, mshta, msiexec, rundll32, or another living-off-the-land binary are unusual for this key, which normally contains file and folder paths. Investigate the process tree for a child of the writing process that matches the stored command.
Tags
Domain: EndpointOS: WindowsUse Case: Threat DetectionTactic: ExecutionTactic: Defense EvasionTactic: Initial AccessTactic: Command and ControlData Source: Elastic DefendData Source: SysmonData Source: Microsoft Defender XDRData Source: SentinelOneData Source: CrowdstrikeThreat: ClickFixThreat: Living off the LandRule Type: ES|QLPlatform: WindowsLanguage: esql
Severity
high
Risk Score
73
MITRE ATT&CK™

Execution (TA0002)(external, opens in a new tab or window)

Defense Evasion (TA0005)(external, opens in a new tab or window)

Initial Access (TA0001)(external, opens in a new tab or window)

Command and Control (TA0011)(external, opens in a new tab or window)

License
Elastic License v2(external, opens in a new tab or window)

Definition

Integration Pack
Prebuilt Security Detection Rules
Related Integrations

endpoint(external, opens in a new tab or window)

windows(external, opens in a new tab or window)

m365_defender(external, opens in a new tab or window)

sentinel_one_cloud_funnel(external, opens in a new tab or window)

crowdstrike(external, opens in a new tab or window)

Query
text code block:
from logs-endpoint.events.registry-*, logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*, winlogbeat-*, logs-windows.forwarded-*, logs-m365_defender.event-*, logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*, logs-crowdstrike.fdr* metadata _id, _version, _index | where KQL(""" host.os.type : "windows" AND event.category:"registry" AND event.type : ("creation" or "change") """) and registry.data.strings is not null and ( to_lower(registry.path) like """hkey_users\\*\\software\\microsoft\\windows\\currentversion\\explorer\\typedpaths\\*""" or to_lower(registry.path) like """\\registry\\user\\*\\software\\microsoft\\windows\\currentversion\\explorer\\typedpaths\\*""" or to_lower(registry.path) like """hku\\*\\software\\microsoft\\windows\\currentversion\\explorer\\typedpaths\\*""" or to_lower(registry.path) like """hkcu\\software\\microsoft\\windows\\currentversion\\explorer\\typedpaths\\*""" or to_lower(registry.path) like """hkey_current_user\\software\\microsoft\\windows\\currentversion\\explorer\\typedpaths\\*""" ) | eval registry_data = to_lower(mv_concat(registry.data.strings, " ")) | where // Command form only. A bare path to the binary, such as ...\\powershell.exe, does not match. // PowerShell / PowerShell 7 registry_data like "*powershell *" or registry_data like "*powershell.exe *" or registry_data like "*powershell.exe\" *" or registry_data like "*pwsh *" or registry_data like "*pwsh.exe *" or registry_data like "*pwsh.exe\" *" or // Mshta registry_data like "*mshta *" or registry_data like "*mshta.exe *" or registry_data like "*mshta.exe\" *" or // Msiexec, including a quiet local package such as msiexec /i "\\users\\...\\file.msi" /qb registry_data like "*msiexec *" or registry_data like "*msiexec.exe *" or registry_data like "*msiexec.exe\" *" or // Rundll32 registry_data like "*rundll32 *" or registry_data like "*rundll32.exe *" or registry_data like "*rundll32.exe\" *" or // Cmd. Require /c, /k, cmd.exe, or comspec so a folder name containing "cmd" does not match. registry_data like "*cmd.exe *" or registry_data like "*cmd.exe\" *" or registry_data like "*cmd /c *" or registry_data like "*cmd /k *" or registry_data like "*cmd.exe /c *" or registry_data like "*cmd* /d /c for /r*" or registry_data like "*cmd* in (f_*" or registry_data like "*%comspec%*" or // Other living-off-the-land binaries used in FileFix and ClickFix paste chains registry_data like "*curl *" or registry_data like "*curl.exe *" or registry_data like "*curl.exe\" *" or registry_data like "*wget *" or registry_data like "*wget.exe *" or registry_data like "*wget.exe\" *" or registry_data like "*certutil *" or registry_data like "*certutil.exe *" or registry_data like "*certutil.exe\" *" or registry_data like "*certreq *" or registry_data like "*certreq.exe *" or registry_data like "*certreq.exe\" *" or registry_data like "*bitsadmin *" or registry_data like "*bitsadmin.exe *" or registry_data like "*bitsadmin.exe\" *" or registry_data like "*wscript *" or registry_data like "*wscript.exe *" or registry_data like "*wscript.exe\" *" or registry_data like "*cscript *" or registry_data like "*cscript.exe *" or registry_data like "*cscript.exe\" *" or registry_data like "*conhost *" or registry_data like "*conhost.exe *" or registry_data like "*conhost.exe\" *" or registry_data like "*forfiles *" or registry_data like "*forfiles.exe *" or registry_data like "*forfiles.exe\" *" | keep _id, _version, _index, data_stream.namespace, @timestamp, event.dataset, user.id, user.name, user.domain, host.id, host.name, agent.id, process.name, process.entity_id, process.executable, process.pid, registry.data.strings, registry.path, registry.value

Install detection rules in Elastic Security

Detect Potential FileFix Command via Windows Explorer Address Bar in the Elastic Security detection engine by installing this rule into your Elastic Stack.

To setup this rule, check out the installation guide for Prebuilt Security Detection Rules(external, opens in a new tab or window).