Microsoft Entra ID Suspicious Session Reuse to Graph Access

Last updated 24 days ago on 2025-07-31
Created 4 months ago on 2025-05-08

About

Identifies potential session hijacking or token replay in Microsoft Entra ID. This rule detects cases where a user signs in and subsequently accesses Microsoft Graph from a different IP address using the same session ID. This may indicate a successful OAuth phishing attack, session hijacking, or token replay attack, where an adversary has stolen a session cookie or refresh/access token and is impersonating the user from an alternate host or location.
Tags
Domain: CloudDomain: IdentityDomain: APIData Source: AzureData Source: Microsoft Entra IDData Source: Microsoft Entra ID Sign-In LogsData Source: Microsoft GraphData Source: Microsoft Graph Activity LogsUse Case: Identity and Access AuditUse Case: Threat DetectionTactic: Defense EvasionTactic: Initial AccessLanguage: esql
Severity
medium
Risk Score
47
MITRE ATT&CK™

Initial Access (TA0001)(opens in a new tab or window)

Defense Evasion (TA0005)(opens in a new tab or window)

False Positive Examples
This pattern may occur during legitimate device switching or roaming between networks (e.g., corporate to mobile). Developers or power users leveraging multiple environments may also trigger this detection if session persistence spans IP ranges. Still, this behavior is rare and warrants investigation when rapid IP switching and Graph access are involved.
License
Elastic License v2(opens in a new tab or window)

Definition

Integration Pack
Prebuilt Security Detection Rules
Related Integrations

azure(opens in a new tab or window)

Query
from logs-azure.signinlogs-*, logs-azure.graphactivitylogs-* metadata _id, _version, _index
| where
    (event.dataset == "azure.signinlogs"
     and source.`as`.organization.name != "MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-as-BLOCK"
     and azure.signinlogs.properties.session_id is not null)
    or
    (event.dataset == "azure.graphactivitylogs"
     and source.`as`.organization.name != "MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-as-BLOCK"
     and azure.graphactivitylogs.properties.c_sid is not null)

| eval
    Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_session_id_coalesce = coalesce(azure.signinlogs.properties.session_id, azure.graphactivitylogs.properties.c_sid),
    Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_user_id_coalesce = coalesce(azure.signinlogs.properties.user_id, azure.graphactivitylogs.properties.user_principal_object_id),
    Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_app_id_coalesce = coalesce(azure.signinlogs.properties.app_id, azure.graphactivitylogs.properties.app_id),
    Esql.source_ip = source.ip,
    Esql.@timestamp = @timestamp,
    Esql.event_type_case = case(
        event.dataset == "azure.signinlogs", "signin",
        event.dataset == "azure.graphactivitylogs", "graph",
        "other"
    ),
    Esql.time_window_date_trunc = date_trunc(5 minutes, @timestamp)

| keep
    Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_session_id_coalesce,
    Esql.source_ip,
    Esql.@timestamp,
    Esql.event_type_case,
    Esql.time_window_date_trunc,
    Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_user_id_coalesce,
    Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_app_id_coalesce

| stats
    Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_user_id_coalesce_values = values(Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_user_id_coalesce),
    Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_session_id_coalesce_values = values(Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_session_id_coalesce),
    Esql.source_ip_values = values(Esql.source_ip),
    Esql.source_ip_count_distinct = count_distinct(Esql.source_ip),
    Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_app_id_coalesce_values = values(Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_app_id_coalesce),
    Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_app_id_coalesce_count_distinct = count_distinct(Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_app_id_coalesce),
    Esql.event_type_case_values = values(Esql.event_type_case),
    Esql.event_type_case_count_distinct = count_distinct(Esql.event_type_case),
    Esql.@timestamp.min = min(Esql.@timestamp),
    Esql.@timestamp.max = max(Esql.@timestamp),
    Esql.signin_time_min = min(case(Esql.event_type_case == "signin", Esql.@timestamp, null)),
    Esql.graph_time_min = min(case(Esql.event_type_case == "graph", Esql.@timestamp, null)),
    Esql.event_count = count()
  by Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_session_id_coalesce, Esql.time_window_date_trunc

| eval
    Esql.event_duration_minutes_date_diff = date_diff("minutes", Esql.@timestamp.min, Esql.@timestamp.max),
    Esql.event_signin_to_graph_delay_minutes_date_diff = date_diff("minutes", Esql.signin_time_min, Esql.graph_time_min)

| where
    Esql.event_type_case_count_distinct > 1 and
    Esql.source_ip_count_distinct > 1 and
    Esql.event_duration_minutes_date_diff <= 5 and
    Esql.signin_time_min is not null and
    Esql.graph_time_min is not null and
    Esql.event_signin_to_graph_delay_minutes_date_diff >= 0

Install detection rules in Elastic Security

Detect Microsoft Entra ID Suspicious Session Reuse to Graph Access in the Elastic Security detection engine by installing this rule into your Elastic Stack.

To setup this rule, check out the installation guide for Prebuilt Security Detection Rules(opens in a new tab or window).